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here is something in our national consciousness that looks fondly upon
the small ﬁrm. This affection for small business is not entirely unwar-
ranted. Small ﬁrms account for an important part of economic activity.1
A vast majority of all businesses in the United States are small; over 90 percent
have fewer than 20 employees. Small ﬁrms accounted for between 40 and 50
percent of GNP and over 60 percent of net job growth in the 1980s.2 Such
ﬁgures have drawn considerable attention in recent discussions of attempts to
ease securities and bank regulation or to promote other policies concerning the
ﬁnancing of small ﬁrms.
This long-standing affection has at times generated signiﬁcant public pol-
icy. Much of our antitrust policy was arguably generated more by a general
mistrust of bigness and desire to protect small business than by a concern for the
inefﬁciencies of monopoly pricing. Recently, much attention has been paid to
the plight of the small ﬁrm in raising capital in the face of recently strengthened
bank regulation. Indeed, it seems that a necessary part of the debate over any
proposed public policy action, from health care to tax policy, is the question
of how it will affect small ﬁrms.
A related working paper, “Learning, Firm Size and Investment,” was presented at the
University of Kentucky, and the author thanks the seminar participants, and Dan Black
in particular, for their comments. This article has also beneﬁted from discussions with
Jeff Lacker and with Gordon Phillips on this and ongoing joint work. The views expressed
herein are the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 Small ﬁrms can be deﬁned as those with fewer than 500 employees or those with reve-
nues or assets below some standard. The Small Business Administration uses the employment
deﬁnition, while the Securities and Exchange Commission uses a revenue standard ($15 million
annually) for exemption from some registration requirements.
2 These ﬁgures are drawn from the Small Business Administration (1992).
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This article examines some aspects of the ﬁnancial behavior of small ﬁrms
as compared to larger ﬁrms. A particular focus is the question of whether there
is a failure in ﬁnancial markets that limits the activities of small ﬁrms. Both
theoretical and empirical analyses of ﬁnancial behavior have suggested that such
a market failure might exist. The theoretical arguments center on problems of
asymmetric information; when lenders are less well informed than borrowers
about borrowers’ conditions and activities, credit markets may not clear in the
conventional fashion.3 Such a failure of markets to function efﬁciently might
suggest a role for government intervention to improve the allocation of ﬁnancial
capital.
Recent evidence on the investment behavior of large and small ﬁrms sug-
gests the possibility that informational problems weigh more heavily on small
ﬁrms. In particular, there is evidence that investment by smaller ﬁrms is more
sensitive to factors that, in a world of perfect capital markets, are not expected to
affect investment. The ﬁrst section of this article surveys some of the evidence
on differences in ﬁnancial behavior across ﬁrm sizes, including the evidence
on investment behavior.
The second section turns to theoretical interpretations of the evidence. The
ﬁrst of these interpretations is the theory of market failures due to asymmetric
information, building on the idea that a ﬁrm’s insiders will often know more
than outsiders about the ﬁrm’s prospects. This asymmetry can increase the cost
of raising funds from outside investors. The asymmetric information perspective
has led some to conclude that the market typically fails to provide sufﬁcient
ﬁnancial capital.
While the likely effects of informational constraints may well vary with
ﬁrm size, the interpretation of differences in behavior in terms of asymmetric
information implicitly treats ﬁrm size as exogenous. The central point of this
article is that an attempt to provide a theoretical explanation of differences in
behavior across ﬁrm sizes should begin with a theory of ﬁrm size. The next
subsection describes such a theory, drawing from the industrial organization
literature; it is a life cycle theory in which ﬁrms, when they are young, learn
about their productive capabilities. This learning drives the differences in be-
havior between large and small ﬁrms. It turns out that this theory, without
informational market failures, is consistent with much of the evidence on ﬁrm
size and ﬁnancial behavior. Hence, movement toward a theory that jointly
determines size and ﬁnancial behavior weakens the case for a market failure
interpretation of the evidence.
Section 3 discusses some implications for public policy toward the ﬁnanc-
ing of small ﬁrms. Under the theory of market failure due to adverse selection,
3 Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) present a general theory of market failures in the presence
of asymmetric information.      
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investment undertaken by small ﬁrms is inefﬁciently low compared to a world
of perfect information. Some have argued that government intervention can
move ﬁnancial markets in the direction of greater efﬁciency by giving favor-
able treatment to small ﬁrms. Under the alternative theory, there is no market
failure and no role for government intervention.
1. FINANCIAL BEHAVIOR OF SMALL AND
LARGE FIRMS
An image of small business that has appeared in the popular media in recent
years is one of entrepreneurs starved for capital. According to this image,
recent banking legislation reduced the ﬂow of bank loans to small ﬁrms. At the
same time, venture capital provision of equity ﬁnancing fell from the peaks it
achieved in the middle of the last decade. Without access to external ﬁnanc-
ing, small ﬁrms have been limited in their ability to grow and contribute to
employment.
Parts of the above image are no doubt accurate. Most measures of the ﬂow
of external ﬁnance to small ﬁrms show a decline in recent years. Such numbers,
however, must be understood in the proper context. Has the recent experience
of small ﬁrms been qualitatively different from that of larger ﬁrms? By at least
some measures, the answer is no. For instance, commercial and industrial bank
loans to all ﬁrms, large and small, fell in 1991.4
To gain greater perspective on the recent experience of small and large
ﬁrms, one might ask whether there are any systematic differences in the ﬁ-
nancial behavior of ﬁrms of different sizes. One approach to such a question
is to examine the balance sheet characteristics of small ﬁrms. The Census
Bureau’s Quarterly Financial Report provides aggregate balance sheet data for
all manufacturing ﬁrms and for small manufacturing ﬁrms (ﬁrms with less than
$25 million in assets). These data give rise to a few observations. Most notably,
small manufacturing ﬁrms use more bank debt, as a percent of assets, than do
larger ﬁrms. From 1986 to the ﬁrst quarter of 1993, small ﬁrms’ loans from
banks have averaged about 20 percent of total assets, while the corresponding
ﬁgure for all ﬁrms has been less than 10 percent. The difference in the reliance
on bank loans is particularly pronounced in long-term debt (with a maturity
of greater than one year). While smaller ﬁrms have fewer long-term liabilities
(about 40 percent of total liabilities compared to almost 60 percent for all ﬁrms),
more than half of all long-term debt of small ﬁrms is in the form of bank loans.
For all ﬁrms, bank loans constitute less than one-third of all long-term debt.
The observations above on the reliance of small ﬁrms on banks are con-
sistent with ﬁndings from earlier periods. Andrews and Eiseman (1981) ﬁnd
4 The Federal Reserve Bulletin provides ﬁgures on commercial and industrial loans.     
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the same pattern in data from the 1970s and from 1958. The importance of
banks for small ﬁrms is also apparent in survey evidence, such as the Federal
Reserve’s National Survey of Small Business Finance. In an analysis of that
survey’s data, Elliehausen and Wolken (1990) uncover the additional result that
the smaller the ﬁrm, the greater the importance of local rather than distant banks.
This result suggests the importance to small ﬁrms of having a close relationship
with suppliers of funds. Correspondingly, small ﬁrms are less likely to raise
funds in public securities markets.
Since the set of ﬁrms that have not issued public securities tends to consist
of ﬁrms smaller than those in the set of public corporations, it should not be
surprising that those ﬁrms issuing securities for the ﬁrst time are often small
relative to those already public. Most often, a ﬁrm’s ﬁrst public issue is of com-
mon stock equity (an initial public offering, or IPO). While the size distribution
of ﬁrms undertaking IPOs varies from year to year, it typically includes many
small ﬁrms (assets less than $10 million). In 1984, virtually all IPOs were by
small ﬁrms, while in 1985 and 1986, small ﬁrms conducted about half of all
offerings.5
Even within the population of only public corporations, there are differ-
ences across ﬁrm size categories. In addition to the same tendencies cited
above, it is worth noting the covariation of ﬁrm size and dividend behavior
among public ﬁrms. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), in their study of
the investment behavior of a panel of ﬁrms, divide their sample into three
classes based on dividend behavior: ﬁrms with a dividend to income ratio
persistently less than 0.1; those with a dividend to income ratio between 0.1
and 0.2; and those who persistently paid out at least 20 percent of their income
in dividends. The average size (measured by 1970 capital stock) of the highest
dividend-paying group was more than four times that of the middle group and
more than ten times that of the lowest group.
Another way in which smaller ﬁrms seem to differ systematically from
larger ﬁrms is in the relationships between ﬁnancial variables and real economic
decisions. Most notably, there appear to be differences in the determinants of
investment. A useful benchmark for thinking about investment and its relation
to ﬁnancial conditions is the irrelevance result of Modigliani and Miller (1958).
The “Modigliani-Miller Theorem” states that a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy (capital
structure, payment of dividends, etc.) has no effect on its real decisions, in-
cluding investment. Technological and product market opportunities determine
investment and other real decisions. The ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial choices, for instance,
of debt versus equity ﬁnancing, should have no bearing on its real opportunities.
The Modigliani-Miller result applies to a frictionless world of perfect mar-
kets in which all market participants are always fully informed about ﬁrms’
5 Small Business Administration (1992).         
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opportunities. Empirically, the result seems to fail frequently. Financial char-
acteristics are correlated with ﬁrm behavior, and such relationships are most
apparent for smaller ﬁrms.
One focus in the literature on ﬁnancial characteristics and real behavior has
been on the relationship between cash ﬂow and investment. In the frictionless
world of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, the two should be unrelated. A ﬁrm
with good investment opportunities should be able to fund its investment either
out of its own cash ﬂow or by raising external funds. In a world of perfect
information, a ﬁrm with good opportunities will face no barrier in raising funds
from outside investors or ﬁnancial institutions. Hence, unless the size and qual-
ity of the ﬁrm’s investment opportunity set is correlated with current cash ﬂow
performance, there is no reason to expect a correlation between cash ﬂow
and investment. Contrary to this theoretical perspective, there is considerable
evidence that for at least some ﬁrms, cash ﬂow does help determine investment.
The evidence on investment and cash ﬂow comes in two forms, correspond-
ing to two standard approaches to the empirical study of investment behavior.
The ﬁrst of these is based on the Tobin’s q theory of investment.6 Under this
theory, the ratio of a ﬁrm’s market value to the replacement cost of its assets
(Tobin’s q) serves as a measure of the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities. The
theory suggests a regression equation of the following nature:
Iit = β0i + β0t + β1qit + β2CFit +  it, (1)
where Iit is ﬁrm i’s investment in ﬁxed capital in time period t (as a fraction of
current ﬁxed capital input), qit is the Tobin’s q ratio and CFit is cash ﬂow (as
a fraction of current ﬁxed capital input). The null hypothesis is that β2 = 0.
This approach is followed by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). They
reject the null hypothesis, estimating positive values of β2 on a sample of
public corporations. In particular, when the sample is divided into subsamples
according to dividend behavior, cash ﬂow is most strongly related to investment
for the subsample of ﬁrms paying the lowest dividends.
A central focus in interpreting the results on cash ﬂow and investment is
the extent to which, conditional on other variables included in the analysis, cash
ﬂow provides information on the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities. If cash ﬂow
does provide such information, then the empirical ﬁndings are not necessarily
contrary to the Modigliani-Miller results. This issue is the concern of much
of the next section. With this concern in mind, there have been some recent
studies that have supplemented the evidence on cash ﬂow and investment. One
such study is by Fazzari and Petersen (1993). They augment equation (1) to
estimate
Iit = β0i + β0t + β1qit + β2CFit + β3∆Wit +  it, (2)
6 Tobin (1969).          
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where ∆Wit is the change in ﬁrm i’s working capital in period t (as a fraction
of current ﬁxed capital input).7 Like cash ﬂow, working capital can serve as
an internal source of funds for ﬁxed investment. For a sample of ﬁrms paying
low dividends, Fazzari and Petersen estimate a statistically signiﬁcant negative
value for β3. They interpret this result as further suggesting the importance
of internal ﬁnance to these ﬁrms; holding cash ﬂow constant, a ﬁrm ﬁnances
increasing investment by drawing down its holdings of liquid assets. A similar
ﬁnding was obtained by Whited (1991) who examined the tendency of ﬁrms
to accumulate liquid ﬁnancial assets before undertaking a program of ﬁxed
investment.
The second approach used in studying investment behavior involves the
direct estimation of the “ﬁrst-order condition” in a ﬁrm’s value-maximizing
choice of investment. A simpliﬁed version of such a condition for a typical
ﬁrm can be expressed as
Et[mpkt+1] = ρt, (3)
where Et denotes expectation conditional on information available at time t,
mpkt+1 is the marginal product of the capital input, and ρt is the “user cost of
capital,” which, in its simplest form, includes the rates of interest and capital
depreciation between times t and t + 1. Equation (2) determines the desired
amount of capital in the next period (period t + 1), and (net) investment is
simply the change in capital input from the current to the next period. Gilchrist
(1990) and Whited (1992) are among the authors using this approach, the so-
called Euler equation approach. The ﬁndings tend to parallel that of Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen. Equation (2) ﬁts the data well for a sample of ﬁrms that
regularly pay dividends but not for ﬁrms with low, irregular, or no dividend
payment histories. While both approaches outlined above divide the samples
of ﬁrms according to dividend policy, it should be noted that this procedure
also tends to divide ﬁrms by size. As mentioned above, Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen provide evidence on the correlation between size and dividend policy.
The evidence suggests distinct differences in ﬁnancial behavior across ﬁrms
in different size classes. Smaller ﬁrms tend to make considerably less use of
public securities markets for raising external funds. Accordingly, when they do
raise external funds, they are more likely to borrow from a bank or other ﬁnan-
cial institution. Lastly, smaller ﬁrms seem to rely more on internally generated
funds to ﬁnance their investment activities.
7 Working capital is current assets (primarily inventories, cash, and accounts receivable) less
current liabilities (short-term debt and accounts payable).    
J. A. Weinberg: Firm Size, Finance, and Investment 25
2. TWO THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
FIRM SIZE AND FINANCE
While the empirical studies reviewed above provide a picture of how small and
large ﬁrms differ, they give little insight into why they differ. Providing such
insight is the role of economic theory. This section provides two theoretical per-
spectives that might be used to interpret the empirical picture painted above.
The focus of the ﬁrst is on imperfections in ﬁnancial markets. The second
focuses on the causes of variations in ﬁrm sizes in a dynamic, competitive
economy.
Informational Market Failures
The apparent rejections of Modigliani-Miller results have led many economists
to seek out the market imperfections, or sources of market failure, that cause ﬁ-
nancial behavior to differ from the idealized model. One imperfection on which
much attention has been focused is the problem of incomplete or asymmetric
information. A transaction is made under incomplete information when one
party to the transaction has information that is relevant to the other party’s
decision. For instance, a seller may know details about the quality of the prod-
uct or service being sold. It may be difﬁcult for the buyer to perfectly discern
all these details on inspection, or even upon receiving the product or service.
In such a situation, a seller of a truly high-quality product may be unable to
receive a price which fully reﬂects the product’s quality. If high quality is
more costly to provide, then the inability to extract a higher price may serve to
drive high-quality providers out of the market. This problem, ﬁrst analyzed in
some detail by Akerlof (1970), is known as the “lemons” problem or “adverse
selection” problem.
Another variety of asymmetric information problem is the “moral hazard”
problem. The term “moral hazard” refers to the fact that the observable per-
formance of one party to a transaction often depends partly on that party’s
unobservable actions and partly on random events. Hence, the contract govern-
ing the transaction cannot directly prescribe the “morally hazardous” action.
Desired actions must be indirectly induced through the payment incentives in
the contract.
An extensive theoretical literature has examined the implications of private-
information problems for ﬁnancial markets. The focus, here, will be on that part
of the literature which ﬁnds that asymmetric information can raise a ﬁrm’s cost
of obtaining external ﬁnance. If the cost is raised enough, the ﬁrm may be forced
to rely entirely on internal funds to ﬁnance its investment projects. One line
of this research examines the implications of adverse selection for the ability
of ﬁrms to raise funds through the issuance of debt to a competitive market of       
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investors or institutions.8 The key insight in this line of work is that, as in the
lemons problem, a high-quality borrower (that is, one with a low probability
of default) may have difﬁculty credibly conveying credit quality information
to lenders. Hence, even a good borrower will have to pay an interest rate that
compensates for the probability that any borrower might be a bad borrower
(with a high probability of default). In some cases examined in this work, the
problem becomes so severe that some (high-quality) borrowers are unable to
obtain funds at any interest rate. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), among others, have
argued that such a credit rationing result is to be expected in ﬁnancial markets
subject to incomplete information.
There also has been work that has argued that moral hazard can impair a
ﬁrm’s access to external funds. A notable example is Gertler (1992). In such
models, outside investors are unable to directly monitor all of the resource
allocation decisions made inside the ﬁrm. An insider (manager) may have an
incentive to misallocate resources for personal beneﬁt. This incentive is reduced
when the manager’s own resources are put at risk in the enterprise.
When viewing ﬁnancial markets through the lens of asymmetric infor-
mation theory, ﬁnancial intermediaries often emerge as institutions that can
partially resolve the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard by spend-
ing resources on information production. A bank or other intermediary might,
for instance, invest resources in evaluating a borrower prior to lending, as in
Boyd and Prescott (1986). Alternatively, such an institution might engage in
costly monitoring of the borrower’s performance after a loan has been made,
as in Diamond (1984). This perspective is consistent with the popular view of
banks and other intermediaries as institutions that specialize in information-
intensive ﬁnancial arrangements.
When asymmetric information affects the availability or cost to a ﬁrm of
securing external funds, then the Modigliani-Miller results on the independence
of ﬁnancial behavior and real investment may not hold. A simple example may
be useful.9 Consider a ﬁrm that initially has no assets, either in the form of ﬁxed
capital or in the form of more liquid assets. The ﬁrm chooses its investment
in ﬁxed capital, k (in nominal value), and funds its purchase in a competitive
credit market. If it is successful, the ﬁrm will produce output according to
a production function, f(k) (giving output in nominal value). Corresponding
to this production function is a downward-sloping marginal product curve,
as in Figure 1. If unsuccessful, the ﬁrm produces nothing and defaults on its
8 Lacker provides a thorough and critical review of this line of research in this issue of the
Economic Quarterly.
9 The analysis of this example is admittedly incomplete, for a number of reasons. The
purpose is not to give a complete model of ﬁnancial markets but to give a sense of the directions
in which asymmetric information can move ﬁnancial behavior away from the benchmark case of
full information.       
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loan. There are two possible types of ﬁrm. High-quality ﬁrms succeed with
probability PH and low-quality ﬁrms succeed with probability PL < PH.
Consider the problem facing a high-quality ﬁrm. If quality is known to
all participants in the credit market, then the high-quality ﬁrm can borrow at
an interest rate R per unit borrowed such that PHR = ρ, where ρ is the rate
of return available to lenders from an alternative risk-free investment. In this
case, the ﬁrm’s choice of k would be determined by equating the (expected)
marginal product of capital to its (expected) marginal cost, as in equation (2).
This choice is given by k∗ in Figure 1.
Suppose now that only a ﬁrm’s insiders know the ﬁrm’s true quality.
Lenders know only that some fraction, π, of all ﬁrms are high-quality. If the
ﬁnancial market cannot discriminate and must lend to all on equal terms, then
the interest rate on loans, R, must be such that [πPH+(1−π)PL]R = ρ. Facing
such a rate, a high-quality ﬁrm chooses an amount of capital given in Figure
1b yk  < k∗.   
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The presence of low-quality borrowers who cannot be screened out might
be said to impose an externality on the high-quality borrowers. Note, however,
that this externality is only relevant to a high-quality borrower without inter-
nal resources. If, before making its investment decision, the ﬁrm received a
windfall of cash, it would make the higher investment k∗. Hence, this simple
example suggests how, in the presence of asymmetric information, a ﬁrm’s
investment decision can be sensitive to random shocks to cash ﬂow. It is also
worth noting that the example suggests conditions under which a ﬁrm might
ﬁnd it worthwhile to utilize the type of costly information production provided
by a bank. If we think of this information production as providing a “stamp
of approval” or certiﬁcation of true quality, then the value of obtaining such
certiﬁcation depends on the premium resulting from asymmetric information.
This premium, the difference between R  and R∗ in Figure 1, is decreasing in
π, the fraction of high-quality borrowers in the population. Hence, if the role
of ﬁnancial intermediaries is to produce information that counteracts problems
of adverse selection, then the services of intermediaries will have greater value
the more severe the adverse selection problem faced by high-quality borrowers.
Under the asymmetric information view of ﬁnancial markets, some ﬁrms
will undoubtedly be more subject to the problems of adverse selection than
others. Some ﬁrms will have a track record of past performance that will
make it difﬁcult to hide ﬂaws and overstate virtues. Others, particularly young
ﬁrms, will come to ﬁnancial markets as relatively unknown entities. Hence,
if one looked at a cross section of ﬁrms, one might expect deviations from
the benchmark of frictionless ﬁnance to be inversely related to a ﬁrm’s age
and experience. The empirical evidence summarized above suggests an inverse
relationship between such deviations and ﬁrm size. Therefore, the results of
the asymmetric information approach will best conform to observed behavior
if ﬁrm size and age are correlated. It is probably not surprising that age and
size are, in fact, positively correlated in large cross sections of ﬁrms. One might
imagine, then, a life cycle theory of the ﬁrm: as ﬁrms grow, they acquire pub-
licly observed experience that enables them to loosen the bounds of ﬁnancial
constraints. Occasionally, as a result of changes in technology, preferences, or
personnel, a ﬁrm’s past experience becomes irrelevant for its future perfor-
mance. At this stage, a ﬁrm either ceases to exist or returns to an earlier stage
in the life cycle.
Life cycle models like that suggested above have, in fact, been used in
analyzing the distribution of ﬁrm sizes in markets and economies. As will be
discussed in the next subsection, the examination of such a model reveals that
many of the empirical facts outlined above can be explained simply by the
life cycle features of the model, without the additional feature of asymmetric
information. This ﬁnding should prompt caution in considering the possible
public policy implications of analyses based on informational market failures.        
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A Life Cycle Approach to Firm Size and Behavior
Analyzing differences in ﬁnancial behavior among ﬁrms of different sizes is a
bit like reading a book from the middle onward. You ﬁnd characters reacting
to a situation, but you do not know how they got into that situation. Similarly,
in understanding differences between large and small ﬁrms, it may be useful
to have a notion of what determines ﬁrm size. In other words, it may be useful
to have a theory of the size distribution of ﬁrms in a market or an economy.
Such a theory should be broadly consistent with empirical facts about size
distributions.
The industrial organization literature has established a number of facts
about size distributions. Simon and Bonini (1958) observed many of these
facts, and more recent studies have provided some conﬁrmation and some
revision.10 The ﬁrst such fact is that there are, indeed, persistent differences
in ﬁrm size within industries as well as across industries. Size distributions,
either at the industry or aggregate level, tend to be skewed, with relatively
small numbers of the largest ﬁrms and a large mass of ﬁrms in the smaller size
ranges. Earlier studies concluded that rates of growth were independent of ﬁrm
size, but more recent work, such as Evans (1987) and Hall (1987), has found
this to be true only among larger ﬁrms. Overall, there is a negative correlation
between size and growth. In addition, ﬁrm size is positively correlated with
ﬁrm age, as found, for instance, by Evans (1987) and Dunne, Roberts, and
Samuelson (1988). This last fact strongly suggests that life cycle effects may
be important for understanding differences between the average behavior of
small and large ﬁrms.
What the facts outlined above suggest is that there is a considerable amount
of heterogeneity among ﬁrms. A model of a competitive economy that recog-
nizes these facts of industrial organization should incorporate some form of
heterogeneity into the fundamentals of the model economy. One such model
has been provided by Lucas (1978). In a simpliﬁed version of that model,
there is a generic technology available for using capital input to produce an
output. Productivity, however, also depends on the ability of the entrepreneur
or manager using the input.11 Hence, the manager-speciﬁc technology can be
represented by y = θf(k), where y is output, k is capital input, and θ is the
ability of the manager. Choice of inputs is like that represented in Figure 1, in
which marginal product of capital is set equal to ρ, the market cost of capital.
The curve mpk is higher the greater is the parameter θ. Accordingly, for any
market cost of capital ρ, ﬁrms managed by managers with higher θs will be
bigger than those with lower θs.
10 For instance, see Evans (1987) and Hall (1987).
11 Lucas’ model also considers labor input and the division of the economy’s population
between workers and manager-entrepreneurs.      
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In the Lucas model, the underlying distribution of ability in the population
determines the size distribution of ﬁrms. As a static model, however, it cannot
directly address facts concerning the growth of ﬁrms. A related model, ﬁrst
studied by Jovanovic (1982), adds a dynamic learning process to an environ-
ment similar to that of Lucas. A ﬁrm begins its lifetime uncertain of the value
of θ, its ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity parameter. Output has a stochastic compo-
nent, so that experience provides imperfect information about ability. As a ﬁrm
accumulates more experience over time, uncertainty about the parameter, θ,
declines.
In both the Lucas and Jovanovic models, there is an opportunity cost to
the manager of continuing to produce. This might be, for instance, the value
of working for the market wage or the value of starting a new productive
endeavor. In the static model of Lucas, the existence of such an opportunity
cost simply means that there is a “marginal” level of ability θ0. Anyone with
θ>θ 0 becomes a manager and hires inputs, while anyone with θ<θ 0 pursues
the alternative activity. More precisely, if the value of not being a manager is
C (independent of ability), then the marginal ability level is determined by
θ0 f(k(θ0)) − ρk(θ0) = C. (4)
In equation (4), the notation k(θ) indicates that the optimally chosen level of
capital input is a function of managerial ability. The determination of θ0 is
depicted in Figure 2. In that ﬁgure, v(θ) is the return to being a manager
with ability θ. Figure 3 shows how the determination of θ0 serves to truncate
the distribution of abilities in the population. Hence, even if the underlying
distribution is symmetric, as in the ﬁgure, the distribution of ability among
those who operate ﬁrms will be skewed. This skewness carries over to the
distribution of sizes, because size rises with ability.
In the Jovanovic model, the marginal ability level would be determined
exactly as in equation (4) if managers were fully aware of their abilities from
the outset. With initial uncertainty and learning through experience, a manager
with expected ability less than θ0 may ﬁnd it worthwhile to continue to produce
on the chance that, through favorable experience, he will learn that he is able
enough to remain a manager in the long run. In other words, a ﬁrm may be
willing to take an operating loss, because production has informational value.
A manager’s willingness to incur a short-term loss in exchange for infor-
mation depends on two things: the current expected value of θ and the age of
the ﬁrm. The lower the manager’s expected ability, the greater the expected
operating loss from continuing to operate and the smaller the probability that
the next observation will be good enough to raise expected θ above θ0. The
older the ﬁrm, the more experience it has accumulated. This experience serves
to reduce the remaining uncertainty about θ. Less uncertainty about θ, in turn,
implies a lower probability of experiencing output much greater than expected.  
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Consequently, the probability of a substantial shift in expectation is reduced.
In the learning model, then, a manager will continue to produce as long as
expected ability is greater than some marginal value, θ0n, where n is the age of
the ﬁrm (the number of periods for which it has been operating). Hence, there
is a sequence of thresholds for ﬁrms to continue operating. This sequence has
two notable properties. First, θ0n <θ 0, indicating that ﬁrms will be willing to
take losses in the short run. Second, θ0n+1 >θ 0n, stating that older ﬁrms will
be less willing to take such losses.
Since expected ability determines size, the learning model predicts a pos-
itive correlation between size and age; the further below θ0, the smaller the
ﬁrm and the less experienced it is likely to be. A very stark version of this
model appears in Weinberg (1993). In that version, a ﬁrm starts with a prior
expectation of its productivity. This prior might come from the manager’s past
experiences in other activities or from pre-production research and development
work. Hence, there are a variety of prior expectations in the population. By
producing for a ﬁxed amount of time (one period), the ﬁrm learns its true ability
with certainty. In this way, the population of ﬁrms can be separated into two
classes: young ﬁrms, who are in the process of learning, and mature ﬁrms, who
have already learned their types. If each ﬁrm, young or old, faces an exoge-
nous probability of disappearing (due to exogenous shocks to its technology or
personnel), there will tend to be a steady-state mixture of young and mature
ﬁrms in the economy. Young ﬁrms will be smaller, on average, than mature
ﬁrms. They will also face a higher probability of exit, since they can exit either
because of exogenous shocks or because they learn that their ability is not great
enough to merit continued operation.
The simple, two-class version of the learning model makes it quite easy to
examine differences in investment behavior. The investment of mature ﬁrms is
very simple. Since they have learned their ﬁrm-speciﬁc abilities, their invest-
ment (acquisition of capital for the next production period) will not respond
to current output. In fact, their investment will, on average, merely replace
depreciation (unless there are other sources of ﬁrm growth). Young ﬁrms, on
the other hand, learn about their abilities from their current output. Hence,
conditional on initial size, better performance implies a higher realized ability
level, which, in turn, implies greater investment.
Notice that the relationship between investment and current performance
is very similar to the empirical relationship discussed in Section 1, where cash
ﬂow was used as the measure of current performance. In the models discussed
in this section, there are no imperfections in the capital markets; ﬁrms face no
purely ﬁnancial constraints. The authors of studies that found an effect of cash
ﬂow on investment certainly recognize that cash ﬂow could be serving as an
indicator of investment opportunities. What they overlooked, perhaps, was that
economic theory should give us a strong a priori reason to believe that, in such
regressions, cash ﬂow is playing that role, for small ﬁrms in particular.       
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Comparing the Theoretical Approaches
The two perspectives sketched above represent the two most common explana-
tions of ﬁndings of a cash ﬂow effect in investment behavior of small, growing
ﬁrms; an unexpected boost to cash ﬂow might loosen the ﬁnancial constraints
arising from asymmetric information, or it might provide a signal of enhanced
proﬁtability and thereby shift investment demand. Notice that information plays
a central role in both of these stories. In one, problems arise from the inability
of some market participants to credibly convey private information to other
participants. In the other story, information accumulates over time, but in a
public way. While either one of these approaches can potentially explain the
relationship between investment and cash ﬂow, how do they compare in ad-
dressing some of the other facts outlined in Section 1? This section examines
that question.
In the asymmetric information approach, cash ﬂow affects investment, be-
cause ﬁrms subject to adverse selection pay a premium for external funds.
Some of the evidence seems to support this notion. The ﬁrms for whom the
cash ﬂow effect is the greatest are ﬁrms that pay very little in dividends to
shareholders. For these ﬁrms, working capital, which consists of short-term,
liquid assets, can serve as an additional source of internal investment funds.
In a full information, Modigliani-Miller world, a ﬁrm would be indifferent
between the use of internal and external funds. If, as in the learning model,
current income served as a signal of proﬁtable investment opportunities, then
paying the income out as dividends and raising investment funds externally
would be equivalent to using the income to fund investment internally. Hence,
the Modigliani-Miller framework makes no prediction about the choice be-
tween internal and external funds. Suppose that, in an otherwise frictionless
environment, there were a small transactions cost associated with raising exter-
nal funds.12 Firms would then have sufﬁcient reason to prefer internal funds.
That is, rather than paying dividends and raising funds externally as needed, a
young ﬁrm with good growth prospects will retain earnings to fund its likely
investment needs. Hence, problems of asymmetric information are sufﬁcient
but not necessary for a preference for internal funding.
The learning model, then, is consistent with the observations on investment
behavior and the use of internal funds. Small ﬁrms are more likely to be young
ﬁrms and engaged in learning. For these ﬁrms, the presence of favorable in-
vestment opportunities is correlated with the presence of ample internal funds,
generated from current and recent favorable performance. Larger ﬁrms are more
likely to be mature. For these ﬁrms, investment opportunities are less tied to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc learning from experience. They are correspondingly more likely
12 The type of cost considered here might be the cost of negotiating with an individual
investor or the cost of making the public aware of an issue of public securities.  
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to have opportunities arise in times of low internal resources, requiring them
to go to external sources for funds.
Other than the observations on investment behavior, the key facts discussed
in Section 1 concerned where ﬁrms go for external funds. Most signiﬁcantly,
small ﬁrms go to banks for more of their ﬁnancing than do large ﬁrms. Un-
der the asymmetric information approach, one might suppose that asymmetric
information problems are more severe for small ﬁrms, so that the value of
using bank evaluation and monitoring services is greater for small ﬁrms than
for large ﬁrms. Diamond (1991) develops a model in which such monitoring
is provided to ﬁrms with mid-level reputations. If such a ﬁrm enjoys good
performance, it can improve its reputation and raise public funds. While ﬁrm
size is not directly incorporated in that model, it is not difﬁcult to imagine
a direct link between reputation and size. A similar line of reasoning can be
followed under the life cycle approach. Small, young ﬁrms are likely to face the
greatest uncertainty about their own long-run productivities. Again, the value
of the information production services of banks will be greatest for these ﬁrms.
In both approaches, banks are seen as producers of information. In the former
case, they produce information in an attempt to undo the effects of asymmetric
information, while in the latter, they produce new information that is useful to
the ﬁrm in making its resource allocation decisions. In either case, once a ﬁrm
has accumulated enough information to know (or to convince others) that it is
proﬁtable enough to continue producing, it enters the class of more mature ﬁrms
that utilize public debt and equity markets for their external ﬁnancing needs.
In summary, a theoretical perspective based on asymmetric information
that produces ﬁnancial constraints is capable of explaining observed deviations
from the type of behavior predicted by the frictionless framework of Modigliani
and Miller. By itself, however, this perspective cannot fully explain how those
deviations tend to be more apparent for smaller than for larger ﬁrms. Some
explanation of why the asymmetric information problems weigh more heavily
on some ﬁrms is needed. Such an explanation can be found in a life cycle
perspective. As ﬁrms age and grow, they acquire a public reputation that can
partially undo the constraints imposed by informational frictions. One ﬁnds,
however, that the life cycle perspective is capable of explaining a great deal of
the observed behavior by itself.
Clearly the two theoretical approaches discussed herein are not mutually
exclusive. Firms that are young and still accumulating knowledge about them-
selves are likely to be ﬁrms about which insiders are better informed than
outsiders. Knowledge of self precedes public reputation. However, the presence
of ﬁnancial constraints seems not to be necessary for explaining the empirical
facts discussed above. Since the magnitude of asymmetric information problems
is inherently difﬁcult to measure, it would be discomforting to rely on a theory
that draws its explanatory power from informational frictions. The life cycle
approach provides an attractive alternative.       
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3. SOME PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There has been a great deal of concern in recent years about the difﬁculties that
small ﬁrms face in securing funds from ﬁnancial markets and institutions. A
number of regulatory and legislative initiatives have been put forward to address
the ﬁnancial needs of small ﬁrms.13 Some of these proposals seek to expand
credit to small ﬁrms by easing regulations. The federal agencies with regula-
tory responsibilities for depository institutions have jointly developed a plan to
allow well-capitalized banks to make some small business loans with reduced
documentation requirements. Similarly, the Small Business Incentive Act would
exempt small issuers from some of the registration and disclosure requirements
for issuing public debt and equity securities. A third regulatory approach is
represented by the Small Business Loan Securitization and Secondary Market
Enhancement Act. This measure would ease banking and securities regulations
to facilitate the establishment of a secondary market in small business loans,
similar to that which exists for home mortgage loans. The establishment of
such a secondary market is also the aim of the Small Business Credit Act,
which would create a government-sponsored enterprise to buy and securitize
small business loans. Hence, under this proposal, the federal government would
play a more direct role in intermediating between loan originating banks and
the secondary market. Finally, there have been proposals to provide direct
government subsidies to small business lending. The Small Business Capital
Enhancement Act would create a loan loss reserve fund with contributions from
the government as well as from lenders and borrowers.
While the proposed approaches vary in how they would expand credit to
small ﬁrms, they all share a fundamental premise: if faced with the same terms
and rules as other ﬁrms, small ﬁrms would be underserved by the ﬁnancial
markets. Such a premise is consistent with the conclusions that have been
drawn by some from the asymmetric information perspective. In this view,
ﬁnancial constraints impose inefﬁcient limitations on the operations of small
ﬁrms. Some have argued that such inefﬁciency can be countered by govern-
ment intervention in ﬁnancial markets. Even within the asymmetric information
framework, however, the case for efﬁciency-enhancing intervention is weak.14
Brieﬂy, there is no reason to suppose that the practices we observe in ﬁnan-
cial markets and institutions are not efﬁcient responses to the informational
frictions present in the economic environment. Since government intervention
cannot remove those frictions, there is no reason to suspect that the government
can improve on the responses developed by market participants. Under the life
cycle approach, there is no market failure and, therefore, no reason to suspect
13 Humes and Samolyk (1993) describe the proposals mentioned here.
14 A critique of the case for intervention in the presence of asymmetric information is given
by Lacker in this issue of the Economic Quarterly.  
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that the allocation of ﬁnancial capital can be improved upon by government
intervention.
As noted above, a number of the recent proposals have taken the form of
easing regulatory requirements as opposed to directly or indirectly subsidiz-
ing the ﬁnancing of small ﬁrms. These proposals might be based less on the
notion of informational market failure than on the idea that ﬁnancial markets
and institutions face an excessive regulatory burden. If regulation is excessive,
however, why should its easing be targeted to small ﬁrms? Again, there must be
some reason why small ﬁrms are underserved. One possibility is the presence
of informational market imperfections. Another is that the regulatory burden
may be excessive for the ﬁnancing of small ﬁrms but not for larger ﬁrms. This
possibility could arise if, for instance, the costs of complying with regulations
had a sizeable ﬁxed component. This line of thinking probably lies behind
proposals to allow small-ﬁrm exemptions from documentation and disclosure
requirements for bank lending and issues of public securities.
Government intervention in favor of small ﬁrms, then, can be viewed as
partially offsetting the effects of existing government intervention. Desirability
of such a move depends on the reasons for the original intervention and on
the judgment of how much regulation is excessive. Consider the case of easing
bank regulations for small-ﬁrm lending. Suppose that ﬁnancial behavior follows
a version of the life cycle model in which banks provide information production
services that aid ﬁrms (younger ﬁrms in particular) in their productive decisions.
In this model, the population of potential ﬁrms is divided into three groups,
depending on their priors: those that raise funds in public securities markets;
those that receive bank funding and information services; and those that do not
receive funding. Regulations on bank lending can be interpreted as increases in
the costs of producing these information services. This increase in costs does
two things. On the “high end,” ﬁrms with sufﬁciently favorable priors will be
induced to forgo bank services and raise more of their funds in public markets.
These ﬁrms will be larger than the average bank client but smaller than the
average public ﬁrm. On the “low end,” ﬁrms with marginal priors will ﬁnd
themselves priced out of the market for bank lending. They will be among the
smallest ﬁrms. Recent years have seen just such a coincidence of reduced bank
lending with increasing numbers of initial public offerings.
A small-ﬁrm exemption to some bank regulatory requirements will reverse
the low-end effect and, depending on the cut-off size, possibly the high-end
effect. Is such a reversal desirable? Suppose that the original regulations were
put in place to counter the perceived incentives for excessive risk taking in-
duced by (implicit or explicit) government guarantees to bank depositors. The
effects of such guarantees are similar to the effects of reducing the cost of bank
information services. Hence, the various policies and counter policies serve to
shift the margin between those ﬁrms that rely on bank ﬁnancing and those that
use public markets as well as the margin between those that are able to obtain       
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bank ﬁnancing and those that are priced out of the market. Choosing the “best”
setting for those margins is a difﬁcult judgment.
The question of choosing the best setting of bank regulations has arisen in
discussions of recent legislative and administrative changes in bank regulatory
policy. Some have argued that stricter examination standards in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 and risk-
based capital requirements in the Basel Accord have driven the cost of bank
lending so high as to contribute to a “credit crunch.” Such arguments have
been made, for instance, by Bizer (1993) and others, on the editorial pages
of The Wall Street Journal. On the other hand, with only a limited time since
the Act’s implementation, it is difﬁcult to disentangle the effects of FDICIA
from other inﬂuences on aggregate credit market behavior.15 While it does
seem to be the case that ﬁnancing of small ﬁrms has been particularly slow
since the implementation of FDICIA, it is also true that small-ﬁrm ﬁnancing
and productive activity is generally more volatile and responsive to business
cycle ﬂuctuations than that of larger ﬁrms.16 This greater volatility is consistent
with the life cycle approach; while the responses of large ﬁrms to a change in
market conditions are likely to be mostly “movements along demand curves,”
the responses of small ﬁrms are more likely to include changes in decisions to
enter or exit from markets.
In summary, neither the asymmetric information approach nor the life
cycle approach provides a deﬁnitive justiﬁcation for a tilt toward small ﬁrms
in ﬁnancial market policy. One might argue for a policy favoring small ﬁrms
on other grounds. Since small ﬁrms account for a large share of employment
growth and since many small ﬁrms engage in highly innovative activities, one
might argue that small-ﬁrm activity generates external beneﬁts that contribute
to the long-run growth of our economy. If such an argument is used to justify
policies favoring small ﬁrms, it is not clear why such policies should work
through ﬁnancial market manipulation. A simpler approach might come in the
form of targeted tax breaks.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Financial behavior should not be viewed in a vacuum. If we observe systematic
ﬁnancial differences across ﬁrm sizes, or across some other ﬁrm characteristic,
we should seek to understand those differences in the proper context. This
article has asked the question, “What does economic theory have to say about
15 For a discussion of the problem of identifying credit crunches, see Owens and Schreft
(1993).
16 The generally greater volatility of small-ﬁrm behavior is found, for instance, by Gertler
and Gilchrist (1991).    
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the joint determination of ﬁrm size and ﬁnancial behavior?” By contrast, the
interpretations of ﬁnancial behavior leading to conclusions of market failure
have been conducted out of context, lacking an explicit theory of the deter-
mination of ﬁrm size. While the market failure interpretation might suggest a
positive role for government intervention in ﬁnancial markets, this conclusion
is less tenable when the empirical facts are viewed in the context of a theory
of the size distribution of ﬁrms.
By taking size differences as given in interpreting ﬁnancial differences,
the market failure approach amounts to partial equilibrium analysis; one mar-
ket (the ﬁnancial market) is examined in isolation from other markets in the
economy. Attempting to understand the joint determination of size differences
and ﬁnancial behavior is a step toward general equilibrium analysis. Hence,
the arguments presented in this article might be viewed as contributions to the
case for the beneﬁts of conducting applied economic analysis within a general
equilibrium framework.
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